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MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING: 
LOOKING PAST THE DRAMA OF THE  
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND REEVALUATING THE U.S. 
DELISTING TREND AMONG NON-U.S. FIRMS 
 
K a l a n i  A .  M o r s e * 
 
Done to death by slanderous tongue  
Was the Hero that here lies; 
 
Claudio 
Much Ado About Nothing 
Act V Scene III  
William Shakespeare  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The one unifying thread that runs throughout the various plots 
and subplots of Shakespeare’s Much Ado About Nothing is the 
plethora of successive obstacles laid in the path of young lovers 
seeking to find love and marital bliss. The courting characters are 
forced to negotiate a series of complex political, social, and moral 
dramas that threaten to keep them apart. In particular, the play 
highlights the travails and challenges of Claudio and Hero, two 
well-intentioned lovers whose romantic plans are repeatedly 
frustrated by the constant intervention and scheming of others. 
As the drama proceeds to climax, Claudio is duped into 
believing that Hero was untrue to him. Claudio publicly denounces 
Hero and shames her in front of the guests assembled to witness 
their wedding. After Claudio discovers that he has been deceived 
regarding Hero’s loyalty, calculating characters again trick him, 
this time making him believe that his slandered beloved has died 
from shame and heartache. In the penultimate scene of the last act 
of the play, standing over what he believes to be his beloved’s 
tomb, Claudio, in the quote above, expresses his frustration and 
 
 
* J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School (2005), M.P.A., Marriott School of 
Management (2005), B.A., Public Relations (2001), Brigham Young University; 
Editor-in-Chief (2005) Founding Publisher (2004),  International Law & Management 
Review. Mr. Morse is an associate in the corporate defense practice of Torkildson Katz 
Fonseca Moore & Hetherington in Honolulu, Hawai`i. The Author would like to thank 
his peers and mentors who have worked so hard to quickly establish the ILMR as a 
quality publication with high standards of excellence. Most of all, he would like to 
express deep gratitude to his wife for offering her unfailing support through the many 
late nights and weekends spent establishing the ILMR. 
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grief over the slanderous lies that caused his lover to faint and die. 
The final scene of the play reveals that Hero in fact lives. The two 
lovers reunite and are finally able to marry.  
Much like the dramas that interfered with Claudio and Hero’s 
pursuit of their desired union, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) has arguably overregulated cross-border investor 
relationships, causing more than its fair share of interference and 
drama. Just as in Claudio and Hero’s case, overreaction, limited 
information, misunderstanding, and fear of the unknown have all 
combined to stifle cross-border investor relationships. The SOX 
drama has recently begun interfering with relationships between 
non-U.S. firms and U.S. capital markets, hindering pursuit of 
otherwise financially rewarding relationships. Much like Claudio 
and Hero, U.S. regulators and non-U.S. firms, both well-intentioned 
parties, seek to establish and perpetuate mutually beneficial 
relationships. But alas, for some confusion prevails, resulting in 
delisting strategies and abandonment of U.S. capital market 
listings. 
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a 
steady wave of financial fraud disclosures began with the infamous 
Enron/Arthur Anderson Scandal. A flurry of corporate greed and 
fraud scandals at other U.S. based firms quickly followed. Financial 
scandals and bankruptcies at WorldCom, Adelphia 
Communications, Qwest Communications, XO Communications, 
Tyco International, and ImClone seized financial markets and 
investors with fear and panic.1 Investor confidence in U.S. 
corporations plummeted, resulting in a mass exodus of investors 
from U.S. securities markets, arguably leading to a sharp drop in 
securities prices.2 Investors and the U.S. public expressed outrage 
at how many corrupt executives possessed and ultimately exercised 
the ability to get away with brazen and rampant fraud.3 
The U.S. Congress reacted in an uncharacteristically swift 
manner, pushing extensive and dramatic corporate governance 
reform proposals through the legislative process. President George 
W. Bush announced his signature of the new SOX act on July 30, 
2002, introducing it as “the most far-reaching reform of American 
 
 
1 Tosha Huffman, Note, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Where the Knee 
Jerk Bruises Shareholders and Lifts the External Auditor, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 239, 246 
(2005) (cost-benefit analysis of SOX compliance). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”4 
Since then, firms and corporations subject to SOX compliance have 
complained heavily and heartily that the dramatic corporate 
governance overhaul amounted to a hastily drafted overreach of 
U.S. federal regulation into financial markets.5  
The drama resulting from the forbidding and dreaded 
requirements of SOX compliance measures caused many firms to 
reconsider their participation in U.S. capital markets. Financial 
media outlets and the investing public have made “much ado” about 
the small handful of non-U.S. firms who have recently elected to 
pursue delisting strategies as a means of avoiding SOX-based 
compliance costs. One notion gaining in popularity is that U.S. 
capital markets no longer offer sufficient benefits to justify 
additional SOX-based compliance costs. Many critics predict that 
the trickle of non-U.S. firm delistings will quickly grow into a 
flood as the purported enormity of SOX compliance burdens push 
more and more firms out of U.S. markets. 
In the SOX drama, just as in Shakespeare’s drama, the passage 
of time, the addition of relevant information, and a renewed 
perspective on issues of true importance can all help well-
intentioned parties look past the misconceptions and drama that 
hinder the pursuit of mutually beneficial relationships. 
This article posits that the SOX drama has been somewhat 
beneficial by shocking the global community into heightened levels 
of accountability, fostering a strong and expanding culture of 
responsible and transparent corporate governance. Furthermore, 
many non-U.S. companies stand to benefit from SOX-type 
compliance initiatives. Accordingly, this article argues that non-
U.S. firms should not allow the SOX drama to push them into 
delisting strategies that will inevitably carry high opportunity costs 
and unexpectedly high delisting expenses. This article provides 
both additional information and a renewed perspective on the SOX 
drama that has driven the delisting trend. Part II of this paper 
outlines a relevant and necessary background on basic SOX 
compliance issues and the non-U.S. firm delisting trend. Part III 
provides perspective by recharacterizing the “draconian” SOX 
regime as a subsiding but necessary knee-jerk reaction by U.S. 
lawmakers. With the primary short-term goals of restoring investor 
confidence and protecting the primacy and reliability of U.S. 
 
 
4 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the 
Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
5 Amey Stone, SOX: Not So Bad After All?, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2005/nf2005081_7739_db016.htm. 
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capital markets well accomplished and behind them, U.S. regulators 
are more willing to let the knee-jerk reaction subside. Part III 
proceeds to show that in 2005, both public firms and U.S. 
regulators approached SOX compliance enforcement differently, 
with cooler heads and more flexible and pragmatic approaches. Part 
IV outlines important legal and compliance considerations for firms 
weighing delisting strategies: opportunity costs, decreased 
compliance cost mitigation, and other regulatory and pragmatic 
ramifications that weigh in favor of pursuing compliance initiatives 
that enable or preserve participation in U.S. capital markets. Part V 
explores the globally expanding culture of proactive corporate 
governance focused on increased accountability and transparency. 
It also highlights cross-cultural and cross-border expectations, and 
competitive and regulatory forces that will eventually disadvantage 
delisted firms. Consequently, Part VI proposes that firms embrace a 
proactive approach to corporate governance reform. By 
strategically leveraging compliance initiatives, firms may capture 
hidden value, operational efficiency, and overall market advantage 
by recharacterizing and leveraging compliance programs as 
proactive improvement initiatives.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Background on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
SOX set forth a host of corporate governance and financial 
reporting requirements designed to revive investor confidence in 
the market and prevent future financial scandals. Its effects have 
been rather dramatic in some respects. While prior to SOX, many 
chief executive officers (CEOs) signed off on financial statements, 
section 906 of SOX boosts compliance and accountability by 
imposing criminal penalties for false certification of financial 
statements.6 In the wake of SOX legislation, some CEOs actually 
chose to resign rather than personally endorse financial statements.7 
While such outcomes obviously grab the media’s attention, SOX 
 
 
6 “Knowing violations” of SOX reporting requirements are punishable by up to 
$1 million in fines and ten years imprisonment. “Willful violations” are punishable by 
fines up to $5 million and twenty years imprisonment. SOX does not specifically 
distinguish between the two kinds of violations, and common law has yet to define the 
difference between “knowing” and “willful” violations. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 § 906(c)(1)-(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf. 
7 ROBERT PRENTICE, STUDENT GUIDE TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 25–26 
(Thompson Publ’g 2005). 
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legislation carries subtler—but arguably more important 
implications—many of which carry high compliance price tags for 
firms falling within their scope.  
Section 404 of SOX, which took effect in July 2005, requires 
managers of U.S. firms with market capitalization greater than $75 
million to assess and, if necessary, upgrade the effectiveness of 
internal financial controls.8 In addition to internal audit costs, firms 
must also hire auditors to create and submit independent reports 
regarding the adequacy of internal controls and report any 
perceived material weaknesses.9 
More specifically, the internal control report required by 
section 404 must include a report of management’s personally 
endorsed10 assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s 
internal controls.11 In addition to the management's internal control 
 
 
8 Floyd Norris, Regulators Seek to Trim Cost of Rules on Auditing, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 2005, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/17/business/17 
audit.html?ei=5070&en=26ac29574d0c2962&ex=1116993600&pagewanted=all 
(registration required). 
9 Id. 
10 Section 302 of SOX requires CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) to 
certify that they have personally reviewed the quarterly and annual financial reports 
filed with the SEC. Such certification amounts to management’s personal endorsement 
that, based on their knowledge, the reports contain the truth and that the company’s 
financial position is fairly represented. See PRENTICE, supra note 7. 
11 In August of 2003, the SEC clarified the definition of internal control as 
“internal control over financial reporting.” In what is clearly an effort to ensure that 
generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) standards are adhered to in the 
preparation of financial reports, “internal control over financial reporting” was further 
defined as: 
A process designed by, or under the supervision of, the registrant's 
principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons 
performing similar functions, and effected by the registrant’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external 
purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles and includes those policies and procedures that: 
 
(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail 
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the 
assets of the registrant; 
 
(2) Provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as 
necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that 
receipts and expenditures of the registrant are being made only in 
accordance with authorizations of management and directors of 
the registrant; and 
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report, SOX requires external auditors to evaluate and submit 
independent reports evaluating the quality of the company’s 
internal controls and the accuracy of financial statements filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).12 Previously, 
corporate management had the primary responsibility of ensuring 
the accuracy of financial statements. However, “progressive” 
accounting practices and “creative” reporting tactics in competitive 
capital markets had long since diminished the relative value of 
accuracy and honesty in financial reporting for investor relations 
purposes.13 Thus, the need for increased accountability at higher 
levels. 
Since its inception, the costs and efforts required by SOX 
stricter compliance demands have rattled public corporations and 
raised a significant outcry that has not gone unnoticed by SEC 
regulators.14 During the summer of 2003, the SEC released its 
compliance requirements for section 404 but chose to stagger future 
compliance deadlines based upon differing firms’ respective market 
capitalization.15 Large firms with market capitalization greater than 
$75 million received earlier compliance deadlines for their annual 
reports that fiscal year while smaller companies with market 
capitalization less than $75 million received later compliance 
deadlines for filing their annual reports.16  
Such concessions, however, failed to improve the mood among 
the firms required to comply with section 404. For most public 
firms, the task of documenting and testing their financial 
accounting processes to ensure the accuracy of reports proved as 
                                                                                                          
(3) Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely 
detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of the 
registrant's assets that could have a material effect on the financial 
statements. 
Final Rule: Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8238, 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, & 
274 (June 11, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm#ia. 
12 Section 302 specifically imposes responsibility for financial reporting upon 
corporations. Nevertheless, in giving the SEC sole authority to promulgate the rules 
related to the implementation and reporting associated with § 302, corporations lose 
what autonomy they previously enjoyed. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 7241 (2005), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/ 
sarbanesoxley072302.pdf. 
13 PRENTICE, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
14 According to some, including Congress, this rattling was long overdue and 
necessary to revive investor confidence and preserve the integrity of capital markets. 
Id. at 10. 
15 Huffman, supra note 1, at 251. 
16 Large cap firms had to begin compliance that next fiscal year, 2004. Smaller 
cap companies still within  fiscal years were given until the first fiscal year ending on 
or after April 15, 2005. Id. 
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daunting as it was unwelcome.17 Complaints and calls for repeal 
reached a fevered pitch in the fall of 2004 when most large cap 
firms found themselves wading through the oppressive morass of 
internal control restructuring required by section 404.18  
In a continued effort to respond to firms’ needs, the SEC 
recently reviewed the first year of section 404 compliance efforts 
and fine-tuned the implementation of SOX legislation. As its 
primary goal, the review gauged SOX’s effect upon U.S. domestic 
public firms and the outside auditors attesting to the quality of their 
internal controls and management reports.19 This review resulted in 
the issuance of guidance statements from the SEC, offering tips and 
concessions to management and auditors, facilitating cost 
mitigation and promoting efficiency in section 404 compliance 
efforts.20 Section III.D. below discusses the relevance of such 
concessions and the impact of such guidance on a firm’s delisting 
and compliance strategies. 
As regulator of the largest and most vigorous capital market in 
the world, the SEC has also taken steps to ease SOX compliance 
burdens for non-U.S. firms. Although all companies, whether U.S. 
or non-U.S., are subject to section 404 compliance by virtue of their 
listings on U.S. stock exchanges, the SEC specifically granted non-
U.S. companies one extra year to comply with section 404.21  
More than 1,400 non-U.S. public companies access U.S. 
securities markets in one form or another.22 In 2003, Europe alone 
accounted for 305 of the non-U.S. firms required to file reports 
with the SEC by virtue of trading equity or debt in U.S. markets.23 
Thus, the SEC’s choice to exempt non-U.S. companies from the 
first wave of section 404-implementation is no trivial concession. 
Furthermore, as this paper will show, the SEC continues to move 
towards easing international compliance burdens and preserving the 
global appeal of U.S. capital markets. 
 
 
17 Stone, supra note 5. 
18 See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 1, at 257–58. 
19 Richard Baumann & Sarah Cebik, SEC Shows Flexibility on Sarbanes-Oxley 
Internal Controls Rules, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP EUPDATES, May 17, 2005, 
http://www.dorsey.com/publications/legal_detail.aspx?FlashNavID=pubs_legal&pubi
d=191913303 [hereinafter SEC Flexibility]. 
20 Id. 
21 Bob Sherwood, Long Arm of the US Regulator, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 
Mar. 10, 2005, at Business Life 14, available at http://www.internationaltraderelations 
.com (follow “Long Arm of Sarbanes-Oxley: Regulatory Imperialism” hyperlink). 
22 PRENTICE, supra note 7, at 6. 
23 Beth Carney, Foreign Outfits Rue Sarbanes-Oxley, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Dec. 15, 
2004, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec2004/nf20041215_ 
9306_db016.htm. 
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B. Section 404 Costs 
 
Section 404 audits cost more than traditional audits. The most 
costly components are tied to increased internal controls testing and 
generating an external auditors’ opinion on management's 
assessment of internal controls. A significant cost consideration for 
both of these functions is the fact that many firms must first create 
these new assessment and compliance programs before 
management can even begin to make a reasonable assessment of 
internal controls. 
Because external auditors must now file an independent opinion 
regarding both financial statements and internal control reports, 
audit fees are rising significantly. Prior to section 404, auditors 
developed a basic understanding of a firm’s internal controls, just 
enough to facilitate the planning and implementation of financial 
statement audits. At the time, the auditors only concerned 
themselves with assessing the risk of material misstatements 
detected by internal controls. The Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), established by SOX,24 stated that 
evaluating financial statements based on an understanding of 
internal controls is insufficient to express a valid opinion on the 
integrity of controls themselves.25 Thus, auditors must delve much 
deeper, management must accommodate extensive auditor 
inquiries, and costs rise accordingly.  
In addition to auditing costs, section 404 will also ensure that 
businesses spend a great deal on the development of internal 
control systems. Developing and assessing robust internal control 
systems requires the following components, all of which tend to 
boost compliance costs: external resources, staff hours, 
management’s time and attention, and new technology 
deployment.26 While it remains difficult to estimate exact out-of-
 
 
24 The PCAOB was established by SOX to:  
[O]versee the audit of public companies that are subject to the 
securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests 
of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of 
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies 
the securities of which are sold to, and held by and for, public 
investors. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2005), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf. 
25 Donald K. McConnell Jr. & George Y. Banks, Auditing/Internal Controls: 
How Sarbanes-Oxley Will Change the Audit Process, J. ACCT., Sept. 2003, at 49, 51. 
26 Huffman, supra note 1, at 255 (two Fortune 500 CEOs estimated that their 
companies will need approximately 20,000 staff hours to comply with the internal 
control requirements). 
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pocket and opportunity costs for the latest round of section 404 
measures, most firms have fairly good estimates of the logistical 
requirements associated with planned compliance efforts. A 2003 
survey by Price Waterhouse Coopers found that executives believe 
most SOX compliance costs will arise from increased needs for 
internal resources rather than external auditing costs. Such needs 
include documentation, legal compliance, policy development, self-
assessment, staff training, and the adoption of new tools and 
technology.27 
Dire predictions of compliance challenges expected by U.S. 
firms provided more than ample ammunition for non-U.S. firms to 
fight SOX compliance; however, the first year of U.S. firms’ 
performance in the section 404 compliance arena largely lays to 
rest the dire scenarios predicted for U.S. firms. Approximately 282 
U.S. firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
NASDAQ informed the SEC in the spring of 2005 that they would 
file their annual reports late.28 While that seems to be a large jump 
from the fifty-nine late reports filed in the previous year, 
acknowledging that a total of 6,200 firms are listed on both 
exchanges provides perspective as the actual percentage of delays. 
Thus, the actual percentage is far smaller than earlier predictions 
that a third of the market would encounter problems with timely 
filings.29 
 
C. The Non-U.S. Firm Delisting Trend 
 
Widely varying compliance cost estimates justifiably concern 
non-U.S. firms. In late 2004, professional accounting publications 
surveyed 113 U.K. firms with dual listings in both the U.K. and the 
U.S., on NASDAQ or the NYSE, and reported that firms anticipate 
section 404 compliance efforts alone to cost them a total of £120 
million or $241 million.30 Financial Executives International 
 
 
27 Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, May 6, 2004, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=546626. 
28 Corporate Counsel, Learning to Love SOX, CORP. COUNS. MAG, June 22, 2005, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/pubarticleCC.jsp?id=1118666115111 
(registration required) (Edward Knight, General Counsel for The NASDAQ Stock 
Market Inc., arguing that SOX has accomplished its main goal of restoring investor 
confidence in U.S. stock markets). 
29 Id. 
30 Paul Grant & Brian Moher, SEC Blocks Sarbox Escape from US, ACCT. AGE, 
Dec. 2, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news 
/2036519/sec-blocks-sarbox-escape [hereinafter Sarbox Escape]. 
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estimated compliance costs averaged around $3 million or £1.6 
million per company, suggesting that the total figure could reach as 
high as £177 million or $315 million.31 Disparities of £57 million or 
$102 million between estimates fuels the trepidation and 
speculation that makes dual-listed corporations take a long, hard 
look at the relative value of their U.S. listings.  
Despite the offer of one extra year to reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding compliance costs, and an opportunity to rely upon the 
experiences of U.S. firms and auditors to guide them, some non-
U.S. firms are focusing less on getting the right systems and 
controls in place than on performing cost-benefit analyses for their 
U.S. listings. Citing the costs of SEC registration as 
disproportionate to the perceived benefits, O2, a U.K. wireless 
company, announced plans to delist from the NYSE and dissolve its 
American Depository Receipts program.32 U.K. media giant ITV 
also announced plans to delist in the U.S.33 
After performing their own cost-benefit analyses, other non-
U.S. firms did not take long to reach similar conclusions and take 
action. The U.K. internet travel company—lastminute.com— 
withdrew its NASDAQ listing in late 2004 and garnered significant 
media attention on both sides of the Atlantic. The trend has spread 
outside of the U.K. as well.34 Swedish tobacco firm Match, Nordic 
telecom group TeliaSonera, and German e-commerce software 
company Intershop Communications have all pulled out of U.S. 
markets and auditors lay much of the blame for the European 
delisting trend on section 404’s doorstep.35 
 
D. Delisting Challenges 
 
Notwithstanding the relative ease of delisting from the various 
U.S. exchanges, the more important and far more complex 
challenge of deregistering from the SEC will confound non-U.S. 
firms’ efforts to avoid SOX compliance. Many non-U.S. firms have 
shied away from pulling out of U.S. markets largely because of the 
300-U.S.-shareholder rule, which exacerbates the logistical costs 
 
 
31 Id. 
32 Sherwood, supra note 21. 
33 Id. 
34 Paul Grant & Brian Moher, US Delisting Trickle Set to Become a Flood, ACCT. 
AGE, Nov. 25, 2004, at 8, available at http://www.managementconsultancy.co.uk/acco 
untancyage/analysis/2040840/delisting-trickle-set-become-flood [hereinafter Delisting 
Trickle]. 
35 Id. 
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and difficulty of deregistering from the SEC.36 To ensure U.S. 
shareholders are protected, once a firm registers with the SEC it 
cannot withdraw its registration if it has more than 300 U.S. 
shareholders. Additionally, all SEC registered firms must comply 
with SOX provisions, regardless of whether they are listed on a 
U.S. market or not.37 
A closer look at the specific requirements and practical 
ramifications of the 300 U.S. shareholder rule reveals just how high 
the SEC has set the deregistration barrier. In addition to the 
financial, accounting, and public relations challenges associated 
with withdrawing from U.S. markets, firms must also deal with the 
logistical challenges related to tracking down all U.S. resident 
shareholders. The firm must then find a tactful way to compel their 
U.S. investors to sell their shares back to the company or put them 
on the market and ensure that only non-U.S. investors purchase 
them.38 Deregistration usually occurs ninety days after the firm 
certifies to the SEC that fewer than 300 U.S. residents hold shares, 
but the compliance issues do not stop there. Once the foreign firm 
surmounts all those challenges, the number of U.S. shareholders 
must remain below 300 for at least eighteen months after the 
completion of SEC deregistration or the SEC will again impose its 
reporting requirements upon the firm.39 
When determining the number of U.S. shareholders, the SEC 
includes underlying individual shareholder accounts rather than 
brokers and banks.40 Thus, the costs associated with getting the 
number of U.S. investors below 300 can prove quite large, not to 
mention the costs of avoiding and settling legal disputes with 
shareholders forced to divest their shares.41 Finally, even after 
going through all the hassle of delisting and deregistering, 
conducting certain kinds or levels of business in the U.S. can bring 
companies back under the SEC's jurisdiction.42 
 
 
36 Paul Grant, SEC Open to Delisting for UK Companies, ACCT. AGE, Dec. 9, 
2004, at 2, available at http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/20365 
72/sec-open-delisting-uk-companies [hereinafter SEC Open]. 
37 Robert C. Pozen, Discussion Paper, Can European Companies Escape U.S. 
Listings?, 464 HARV. JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR L. ECON. & BUS. (2004), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/Pozn-
European-Companies-464.pdf. 
38 Id. 
39 Michelle Perry, Sarbox: Escape from New York, ACCT. AGE, Dec. 22, 2004, at 4, 
available at http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/analysis/2040849/sarbox-
escape-york. 
40 Sherwood, supra note 21. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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The challenges presented by the 300-U.S.-shareholder rule have 
not gone unnoticed by U.S. regulators and institutions. NYSE 
officials have called for reforms, calling the rule arcane and 
labeling it a significant delisting roadblock.43 The SEC has also 
publicly acknowledged that non-U.S. firms struggling with SOX 
compliance burdens should find it easier to delist from U.S. 
markets, characterizing the rule as an important regulation that it 
should reevaluate.44  
The SEC also publicly acknowledged the desire of all firms to 
come into and go out of markets as they wish but cited the 
challenges of balancing such freedom with the U.S. government’s 
mandate to protect investors and preserve the stability that makes 
U.S. capital markets so valuable.45 The future will show what kind 
of action will follow the SEC’s recent expressions of compromise 
and empathy. Whatever happens, firms should be aware that the 
SEC has reportedly taken the issue under “serious consideration.”  
Significant changes, however, are unlikely to come fast enough for 
firms looking to deregister.46  
European business groups, aware of the crucial distinction 
between delisting from a U.S. exchange and deregistering from the 
SEC, launched a campaign to urge the SEC to make it easier for 
companies to deregister.47 Although they have not indicated which 
proposals are under serious consideration, SEC commissioners 
reported leaning towards proposals that do not diminish protection 
for U.S. investors. Of the various proposals under consideration, 
the trading volume test has raised the most eyebrows48 as large 
firms with high trading volumes could easily have thousands of 
 
 
43 Sarbox Escape, supra note 30. 
44 Alan Beller, Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, was 
quoted as saying that the 300 shareholder rule should be relaxed to a certain degree. 
See SEC Open, supra note 36. 
45 SEC Open, supra note 36. 
46 Perry, supra note 39.  
47 Europe’s business lobbying groups include the Association Française des 
Entreprises Privées in France, Deutsches Aktieninstitut in Germany, and the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI). In March 2005, these organizations, 
represented by the law firm of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, sent a letter to SEC 
chairman William Donaldson, requesting that deregistration procedures be made 
easier following a delisting. Jana Sanchez, Hotel California, IRONTHENET.COM, June 
2005, http://www.ironthenet.com/feature.asp?current=1&articleID=4173. See also 
Rank Could Look at US Delisting, INSIDE SARBANES OXLEY, Dec. 1, 2004, 
http://www.insidesarbanesoxley.com/sarbanes_oxley_blog/2004/12/rank-could-look-
at-us-delisting.asp. 
48 Sanchez, supra note 47. 
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U.S. shareholders while maintaining a relatively low U.S. trading 
volume by virtue of the sheer mass of shares traded globally.49  
When the SEC wrote the original rule in 1934, 300 shareholders 
fairly reflected a significant percentage of investors given the 
relative size of the market at that time. Accordingly, it comes as no 
surprise that another seriously considered proposal involves raising 
the U.S. shareholder limit to 3000 to better reflect the size of 
modern capital markets.50 Regardless of what form regulatory 
changes take, expectations are high that the SEC will loosen the 
rules to some degree. Thus, U.S. and non-U.S. firms alike should be 
aware of both the delisting/deregistering distinction and the 
probability of relaxed shareholder limits. It makes little sense to 
bear the direct and indirect costs of satisfying comparatively simple 
delisting requirements while ignoring the more costly and complex 
requirements of deregistering, thus incurring all the delisting costs 
and drawbacks without actually escaping SOX compliance costs or 
noncompliance penalties.51 
 
III. THE KNEE-JERK SOX DRAMA AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR NON-U.S. FIRMS 
 
The U.S. federal government has historically expanded its 
regulation of financial markets when times of significant economic 
turmoil have threatened the nation’s economic prosperity.52 SOX’s 
sweeping reach became an indication of the pressure on both 
financial markets and Congress in late 2001 and early 2002. Given 
the intense pressures of the day, one might arguably characterize 
SOX governance mandates, such as section 404, as window 
 
 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Sarbox Escape, supra note 30. 
52 For example, Congress enacted the Future Trading Act of 1921 in the wake of 
a severe recession after World War I when Europe’s presence in the world agricultural 
markets increased. Farm prices collapsed and farm foreclosure rates skyrocketed with 
the elimination of U.S. price controls. Similarly, after the stock market crashed in 
1929, the Great Depression prompted far-reaching extensions of federal power over 
capital markets. Conspicuous among these was the enactment of federal securities 
laws in the 1930s as part of the New Deal. SOX is just one more instance of 
reactionary legislation. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1591–92 (2005), available at 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/114-7/Romano.pdf (arguing that SOX provisions 
were the result of political considerations amid a free-falling stock market and media 
frenzy over corporate scandals shortly before congressional elections). 
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dressing, the adoption of which only made sense insofar as it 
calmed the media frenzy surrounding corporate scandals.53 
In a more stable climate, Congress might have sought a 
different balance between reform implementation costs and 
improvement in audit quality or other investor benefits.54 However, 
with the losses from the financial scandals of the day still stinging 
and fresh, future compliance costs seemed a trite concern as 
Congress quickly signed SOX into law.55 Three years later, with the 
pain and uncertainties generated by the Enron and WorldCom 
losses fading into history, the full extent of SOX compliance costs 
weigh heavily upon firms obligated to comply. Though predictions 
remain understandably dire, firms still cannot accurately predict 
exact compliance costs, largely because the SEC’s implementation 
of SOX mandates will determine the nature and extent of costs for 
both U.S. and non-U.S. firms.56 When the actual costs play out, 
however, U.S. legislators and regulators are likely to follow their 
knee-jerk reaction with a softened stance.  
Regardless of just how aggressively the SEC plans to 
implement SOX standards, the handful of firms deciding to 
withdraw from U.S. capital markets reflects the skepticism some 
firms harbor regarding the value of their U.S. listings.57 Rather than 
delist and raise capital in non-U.S. markets, some firms choose to 
go private—especially some specific types of firms. Certain 
characteristics, such as small firm size, low share-turnovers, and 
large proportions of inside ownership, have factored heavily in the 
bulk of withdrawal decisions.58  
Unlike small, closely held firms, many large international firms 
clearly recognize the value of maintaining unfettered access to U.S. 
capital markets. In an effort to defray SOX compliance costs 
without delisting, the European business community rallied its 
executives and lobbyists to meet with SEC officials in late 2004 to 
 
 
53 Id. at 1585. But see Corporate Counsel, supra note 28 (Edward Knight, General 
Counsel for The NASDAQ Stock Market Inc., arguing that SOX has accomplishing its 
main goal of restoring investor confidence in U.S. stock markets). 
54 Romano, supra note 52, at 1585. But see Norris, supra note 8 (roughly eight 
percent of SOX-affected companies reported material weaknesses in internal controls, 
many causing errors in financial statements, which strongly indicate that SOX indeed 
addressed a serious problem). 
55 Romano, supra note 52.  
56 Id. at 1590. 
57 In the first half of 2003, sixty-seven companies notified the SEC of their 
intention to go private, a dramatic increase over the seventeen-privatization 
notifications for the first half of 2002. Huffman, supra note 1, at 255–56. 
58 See Engel et al., supra note 27. 
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advocate rule changes to ease the compliance burden for non-U.S. 
firms.59 Shortly thereafter SEC officials reassured business 
communities outside the U.S. that they were listening to foreign 
concerns about increasing compliance burdens60 and subsequently 
announced their consideration of the proposal to delay section 404 
compliance deadlines for foreign registrants.61 The SEC eventually 
made the proposal official, announcing that non-U.S. firms would 
have one extra year, until July 15, 2006, to comply with SOX.62  
While foreign firms view the delay as a welcome concession, 
compliance concerns remain. Many of those involved in the system, 
including SEC officials, express concern that section 404 
compliance initiatives will amount to little more than “expensive, 
short-term, check-the-box exercise[s], taking focus away from 
management and moving it to internal and external auditors.”63 The 
time and resource intensive requirements of section 404 have 
played a key role in branding overseas SOX compliance as a 
draconian U.S. response to the Enron scandals, especially in the 
European business community. In 2005 the SEC announced its 
intention to continue monitoring implementation of section 404 and 
its impact upon smaller public companies and non-U.S. issuers, 
signaling a willingness to deal far more flexibly with non-U.S. 
firms than merely extending the section 404 compliance deadline.64 
Recognizing the need for additional concessions65 to revitalize 
global investment trends, the SEC also offered additional relief 
beyond section 404. For example, European firms struggling with 
massive International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
conversion projects can now anticipate overlaps of IFRS and U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) requirements, 
resulting in easier compliance with both.66 
 
 
 
59 Carney, supra note 23.  
60 Sherwood, supra note 21. 
61 AccountancyAge.com, EU Regulation Will Halt Delisting from US, ACCT. 
AGE, Jan. 28, 2005, http://www.accountancyage.com/2036793 [hereinafter EU 
Regulation]. 
62 Delisting Trickle, supra note 34. 
63 Sherwood, supra note 21. 
64 SEC Flexibility, supra note 19. 
65 Also indicative of U.S. efforts to maintain efficient markets, the SEC is also in 
the process of considering new approaches to the deregistration process for foreign 
private issuers for whom SOX compliance costs outstrip the total value derived from 
maintaining listings in U.S. markets. Paul Grant, A Shift in US Foreign Policy, ACCT. 
AGE, Feb. 4, 2005, http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/analysis/204086 
0/shift-foreign-policy [hereinafter Foreign Policy]. 
66 Id. 
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A. Changing Compliance Attitudes 
 
Criticism abounds despite the SEC’s initial efforts to 
accommodate non-U.S. corporations looking to escape the long arm 
of SOX. David Howell, former Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of 
lastminute.com, which delisted from NASDAQ last year, blamed 
regulatory costs and called the SEC’s reform efforts too little too 
late.67 “Even without Section 404 the cost of listing was about 
£500,000,” he said. “Section 404 moved it into a whole new 
stratosphere.”68 With high average compliance costs in general,69 
and uncertainty over exactly how much they specifically risk 
paying, many firms claim to be on the verge of following 
lastminute.com.70 Nevertheless, of all the firms threatening to 
withdraw from U.S. exchanges, only the very smallest firms will 
have the ability to make good on the threat without incurring 
serious costs.71 SEC deregistration procedures will ensure that firms 
will still face significant compliance costs if they insist on 
withdrawing from U.S. markets.72 
While few managers feel excitement about the past few years of 
SOX regulation, mounting evidence indicates that the business 
community has gone beyond merely coming to terms with SOX; 
some see the potential for improving investor confidence.73 While 
most firms claim a net loss to investors, a handful of finance 
executives who actually perform the compliance work required by 
SOX recognize benefits from compliance efforts. A June 2005 
survey of 200 financial executives found that forty-four percent of 
those polled thought the law resulted in a “net gain to investors,” 
 
 
67 David Rae, Donaldson to Extend 404 Aid, ACCT. AGE, Jan. 27, 2005, 
http://www.accountancyage.com/2036781/donaldson-extend-404-aid. 
68 Id. 
69 Section 404 has been estimated to cost U.S. business more than $30 billion. 
Stone, supra note 5. 
70 Delisting Trickle, supra note 34. Financial management consultancy Parson 
Consulting estimates that SOX compliance will cost the seventy British-headquartered 
businesses included in their survey a total of $860 million. Another survey of 
corporate board members conducted by executive search firm Korn/Ferry International 
estimates that complying will cost the U.S. companies surveyed an average of $5.1 
million. See Neville Hobson, Delisting in the US Because of Sarbanes-Oxley, NEVON, 
Dec. 16, 2004, http://nevon.typepad.com/nevon/2004/12/delisting_in_th.html. 
71 Sarbox Escape, supra note 30. 
72 Id.  
73 Stone, supra note 5. But cf. Engel et al., supra note 27 (proposing a financial 
calculation to aid cost-benefit analyses of delisting, quantifying the firms’ compliance 
costs and SOX-induced benefits accruing to shareholders). 
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while forty-three percent called it a “net loss.”74 Any margin of 
positive response, regardless of how small, reflects a far more 
proactive perception of SOX legislation from what one would 
otherwise reasonably expect. Firms that do decide to pay the SOX 
compliance price admittedly have a lot of work ahead of them. U.K. 
petroleum giant BP recently reported assembling a large 
compliance team that will spend more than one year merely 
evaluating what measures they need for SOX compliance.75 
 
B. Voluntary Compliance 
 
More than three years have passed since the first 
implementation of SOX, and most U.S. firms have only recently 
overcome the compliance challenges presented by section 404. 
While many firms still find little appreciation for SOX, some 
supportive voices back their words with action. Some private and 
non-U.S. firms, not required to comply with SOX, voluntarily adopt 
SOX-like practices for business-related reasons. Marvin F. Poer & 
Co.,76 for example, found a business-related reason to document 
business processes thoroughly. Although Poer has no plans to go 
public, it does handle resources and assets for publicly listed firms. 
Consequently, Poer decided to document internal controls to enable 
issuance of a Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 70 report 
to clients.77 An SAS 70 audit or service auditor’s examination is a 
widely recognized indicator78 that a service organization has 
conducted a thorough audit of internal control activities, 
information technology, and related processes.79 Noting that clients 
need a certain level of comfort and confidence to comply with 
 
 
74 Stone, supra note 5. 
75 This is all the more alarming because BP, which has done SEC filings for some 
time now, would be expected to face fewer compliance challenges than firms that have 
only recently begun filing in the U.S. Delisting Trickle, supra note 34. 
76 Poer is the largest privately held property tax consulting business in the United 
States. Poer has offices around the country that provide property tax consulting, fixed-
asset management, and cost-segregation services. See Marvin F. Poer & Company, 
http://www.mfpoer.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
77 Ronald O. Reed, William M. Sinnett, Thomas Buchman & Richard 
Wobbekind, Why Should Private Companies Implement Sarbanes-Oxley?, RHMR 
LINK, http://www.roberthalfmr.com/Dispatcher?file=/MR/EO_01_Issue16 (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
78 The SAS 70 is an internationally recognized auditing standard developed by 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). About SAS 70, 
http://www.sas70.com/about.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
79 Reed et al., supra note 77.  
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section 404, Poer reports that requests for SAS 70 reports have 
risen dramatically since section 404’s imposition.80 
Non-U.S. firms also voluntarily adopt and comply with SOX-
type provisions for the sake of protection, safety, and flexibility. 
Hapag-Lloyd, Inc., a U.S. subsidiary of TUI AG, a publicly traded 
German firm not listed in the U.S., decided in 2004 that some 
compliance efforts made good business sense.81 Using the Internal 
Control Integrated Framework of the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO), Hapag began reviewing its existing 
procedures and controls. They found many undocumented 
processes and subsequently remedied them. TUI AG recognized 
Hapag’s documentation efforts and subsequently mandated similar 
activities on a global basis for the parent company and all other 
subsidiaries.82 
 
C. Transnational Regulatory Influences over Compliance Costs 
 
When SEC chairman William Donaldson asked the SEC 
Commission staff to consider delaying the effective date of section 
404 compliance for non-U.S. companies, he stated, “It’s clear that 
we need to take a look at some of the details that can be 
improved.”83 Given the timing of his remarks, which followed a 
period of intense lobbying from European business groups, his 
announcement illustrates the SEC’s willingness to reexamine 
SOX’s extraterritorial reach.84 More importantly, his remarks also 
reflect the SEC’s compromising attitude regarding the non-U.S. 
implementation of SOX regulations.85  
In addition to giving non-U.S. companies more time to comply 
with section 404, the SEC also compromised in several instances to 
avoid conflicts with non-U.S. firms’ home-country requirements. In 
response to one such accommodation, the SEC now specifically 
accepts other independent statutory auditor structures where home-
country rules provide for them. Japan and Italy, for example, 
require public firms to have an independent board of statutory 
auditors who serve a function nearly identical to that of SOX-
 
 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Rae, supra note 67. 
84 Id. 
85 While changes in the law itself are highly unlikely, U.S. business lobbyists 
believe that incoming SEC Chairman Chris Cox is likely to issue SEC regulations that 
ease some of the regulatory burdens imposed by SOX. Stone, supra note 5. 
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mandated audit committees.86 Once brought to their attention, the 
SEC rightly recognized that two audit committees would be costly 
and inefficient, not to mention a fertile source of potential conflicts 
of powers and duties.87 German corporate governance rules also 
mirror the intent of other SOX provisions. German law mandates 
that a representative of non-management employees serve on audit 
committees, and the SEC now considers such employee 
representatives independent for SOX purposes.88 
Non-U.S. firms also continue to do their share to find proactive 
solutions and devise overlapping measures to bridge the gaps 
between SOX mandates and the governance and reporting 
provisions of their home countries. German pharmaceutical outfit 
Altana recently found a solution to the facial conflict between the 
SOX requirement that a board’s audit committee hire external 
auditors and the German law’s grant of such authority to 
shareholders. Recognizing the right to hire external auditors as 
nonexclusive, Altana created an audit committee to oversee 
appointment, compensation, and oversight of external auditors.89 
Thus, shareholders retained the authority to appoint outside 
auditors, as accorded by German law, while the SEC’s 
accommodation of corporate governance laws in other countries 
satisfied SOX requirements. 
 
D. The Cost Implications of Reasonable Versus Absolute Assurance 
 
Optimists predict that SOX adherence will lead to lower overall 
costs due to the streamlining and automation of activities that will 
result from comprehensive documentation of key processes and 
internal controls.90 Proponents further argue that SOX merely 
requires actions and policies that well-run companies should 
already have in place. They further maintain that a strong system of 
internal controls helps identify risks and inefficiencies that lead to 
stronger business operations.91 
Such long-term vision, however, does little to ease the current 
sting of section 404 compliance costs. Enter the concept of 
reasonable versus absolute assurance. Managers and external 
 
 
86 Randy Myers, The Global Stance on Sarbanes-Oxley, NYSE MAG., Sept.–Oct. 
2003, at 29, 30–31, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/nysemag03_sept_oct.pdf. 
87 Id. at 31. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Huffman, supra note 1, at 253. 
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auditors should welcome the SEC’s recent exhortations to exercise 
reasoned judgment by implementing a top-down, risk-driven 
approach to their audit and compliance efforts rather than a one-
size-fits-all, bottom-up, check-the-box approach. Indeed, a “check-
the-box” audit has far less likelihood of actually improving internal 
controls than reasonable reliance upon professional judgment aimed 
at securing a reasonable assurance of relevant risks.92 The SEC 
reminded auditors, in particular, to acknowledge and tolerate a 
“zone” of reasonable section 404 conduct, recognizing that 
exhaustive audit activities aimed at securing absolute assurance of 
all conduct typically goes far beyond what section 404 should 
require.93 
While officials remain understandably reluctant to specify 
exactly how much costs should decline as a result of the changes 
and guidance announced by the SEC and the PCAOB, many firms 
will surely recognize significant savings as judgments improve over 
time and audits become more effective, focused, and cost-
efficient.94 
 
1. PCAOB guidance 
 
While new financial control audits give investors added 
confidence in the accuracy and reliability of financial statements, 
strict interpretation may have gone too far in some instances. 
Acknowledging that the first round of internal control audits costs 
too much, the PCAOB in May 2005 issued Auditing Standard No. 
2, “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements” 
(AS No. 2).95 AS No. 2 provides auditors with general and specific 
technical guidance to facilitate the conduct of effective and cost-
efficient audits of public firms’ internal controls over financial 
reporting.96 When William J. McDonough, chairman of the 
PCAOB, announced the issuance of the new Auditing Standard, he 
highlighted the Boards’ commitment to seeing that AS No. 2 is 
“implemented in a manner that captures the benefits of the process 
without unnecessary and unsustainable costs.”97 Chairman 
 
 
92 SEC Flexibility, supra note 19 (emphasis added). 
93 Id. 
94 Press Release, Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., PCAOB Issues Guidance on 
Audits of Internal Control (May 16, 2005), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/News 
_and _Events/News/2005/05-16.aspx. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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McDonough justified the release of policy statements with cost-
cutting interpretations of the rules by conceding “in some cases too 
much work had been done to verify [financial] statements.”98 
Recent PCAOB Policy Statements have refined and limited the 
scope of the internal control audits by explaining how much testing 
of internal control over financial reporting is actually required of 
auditors.99 The PCAOB identified definitional issues and rigid audit 
practices as the primary, unnecessary cost drivers affecting audit 
processes, and thus in need of clarification. In particular, the 
PCAOB has tried to prevent rigid application of AS No. 2 and 
facilitate the exercise of auditors’ professional judgment in the 
conduct of more cost-efficient audits.  
The formal Policy Statement issued by the PCAOB specifically 
outlined cost control tactics auditors can utilize under AS No. 2. 
First, integrate preparations for the conduct of overlapping or 
similar internal control and financial statement audits to ensure the 
dual application and benefit of evidence gathered and tests 
conducted for either audit. Second, exercise professional judgment 
in assembling audit plans; thus, rather than utilizing standardized 
“checklist” audits, auditors can specifically target the relevant risks 
facing individual audit clients. Third, utilize risk assessments 
required by AS No. 2 to help identify low and high-risk accounts 
and then allocate the bulk of audit work towards high-risk areas 
evincing a strong likelihood of material misstatement. Fourth, start 
with company-wide controls and work from the top-down to 
facilitate identification and testing of only those accounts and 
processes that have actual relevance to internal control over 
financial reporting. Fifth, communicate with audit clients regarding 
accounting or internal control issues before100 making decisions or 
implementing internal control processes under consideration. 
Finally, take advantage of the significant flexibility that the 
standard provides, giving auditors the chance to rely upon the work 
of others for guidance and instruction.101 
This last tactic is of particular importance for non-U.S. firms 
faced with section 404 compliance efforts. In addition to the 
 
 
98 Norris, supra note 8. 
99 Id. 
100 The SEC has encouraged management, auditors, and audit committees to 
engage in “frequent and frank dialogue” regarding internal controls and financial 
reporting. The SEC’s auditor independence rules permit such communication and 
cooperation so long as management decides on the accounting to use and the auditor 
does not design or implement the company’s internal controls. SEC Flexibility, supra 
note 19. 
101 These five points are detailed in Press Release, supra note 94. 
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opportunity to learn from the mistakes and experiences of U.S. 
firms required to comply with section 404 one year earlier, non-
U.S. firms may avoid most of the costs and time delays attributable 
to auditors’ first-time experience with section 404.102 Beyond the 
first year, the PCAOB expects continued compliance costs to come 
down as the initial costs associated with the first review of internal 
controls dissipate. Moreover, as mentioned above, many non-U.S. 
issuers can expect to find SOX compliance costs subsumed in the 
costs of home-country compliance efforts. 
 
2. SEC guidance 
 
Expressing concern about unnecessarily high compliance costs, 
the SEC commented on the questionable value of “mechanical and 
even overly cautious” application of the section 404 rules and 
standards.103 The SEC also announced that it expects a more 
efficient integration of future internal control and financial 
statement audits, effectively lowering section 404 compliance 
costs.104 Furthermore, the SEC stressed appropriately tailoring 
internal controls and section 404 compliance methods to the 
operations of smaller companies, signaling the need for auditors 
and management to exercise common sense and a measure of 
previously unacknowledged autonomy to prevent audit costs from 
spiraling out of control.  
More specifically, Donald T. Nicolaisen, chief accountant for 
the SEC, issued a staff report encouraging auditors to use their 
judgment to reduce the checks they perform.105 The SEC also 
strongly encouraged companies with financial weaknesses to 
provide investors with additional information to help them assess 
exactly how relevant such weaknesses really are to investing 
decisions.106 Indeed, some weaknesses may have a pervasive impact 
on internal control over financial reporting while other material 
weaknesses or financial events have little or no impact at all.107 For 
 
 
102 Richard Baumann & Sarah Cebik, Recent US News Affecting European 
Securities Issuers, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP EUPDATES, Apr. 26, 2005, 
http://www.dorsey.com/publications/legal_detail_printable.aspx?pubid=190208603.  
103 SEC Flexibility, supra note 19. 
104 Id. 
105 Norris, supra note 8. 
106 Id. 
107 Congressman Michael Oxley recently cited one extreme example of this 
problem himself. He reported that Ball Corporation, a firm operating in his 
congressional district, recently conducted an audit where the auditors listed the 
janitor’s theft of a few toilet paper rolls from company bathrooms as a “material 
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example, the fact that a company needed to revise financial reports 
does not necessarily prove the initial existence of material 
weaknesses.108 Regarding the definition of “material weaknesses,” 
the SEC also provided a more relaxed definition to determine 
whether certain control weakness need to be reported at all.109  
With regard to compliance facilitation for SEC registrants 
abroad, the SEC adopted measures in April 2005 to provide leeway 
for non-U.S. firms that adopt International Financial Reporting 
Standards, granting one-time relief for eligible non-U.S. firms for 
their first year of reporting under IFRS. Under the rule, eligible 
non-U.S. issuers may file financial statements prepared according 
to IFRS for the two most recent years, rather than the typically 
required three.110 The SEC further extended eligibility to non-U.S. 
issuers reporting under IFRS for the first time with respect to the 
issuers’ 2007 financial year or earlier. The extension reaches far 
beyond the originally proposed cutoff of January 1, 2007, but it 
effectively accommodates issuers with fiscal years beginning after 
January 1, 2007.111 The SEC created additional flexibility in the 
final rule by permitting eligibility for firms that prepare financial 
statements using IFRS as adopted by the European Union (EU 
GAAP), provided the International Accounting Standards Board 
reconciles the EU GAAP and the IFRS.112  
As its staff continues to review section 404 implementation in 
the U.S. and survey the corporate governance landscape abroad, the 
SEC is likely to issue further guidance on section 404 and other 
U.S. accounting requirements in the form of official guidance and 
regulations. As firms and auditors move beyond the start-up costs 
of section 404 compliance and as the SEC continues to provide 
guidance, section 404 compliance costs for all firms will inevitably 
decrease and likely even more so for non-U.S. firms.113 
 
                                                                                                          
weakness” on the firm’s financial reports to the SEC and investors. Aggregation of 
such “total assurance” audit behaviors could easily cause compliance costs to spiral 
out of control. J. Craig Williams, “Material Weakness” in Sarbanes-Oxley May Result 
in Changes, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, Aug. 24, 2005, http://www.mayitpleasetheco 
urt.com/journal.asp?blogId=911. 
108 Norris, supra note 8.  
109 Firms should determine “materiality” based on annual totals for the entire 
company rather than upon the impact an item might have on a quarterly report or on 
results for one part of the company. However, when one or two segments of a 
company are very important to investors, they could appropriately apply an expanded 
definition of material weaknesses. Id.  
110 Baumann & Cebik, supra note 102. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 SEC Flexibility, supra note 19. 
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IV. THE DOWNSIDE OF DELISTING 
 
A. Listing Benefits and Opportunity Costs 
 
With the biggest capital markets in the world, international 
firms have long complied with U.S. regulations for the sake of 
maintaining their listings on U.S. markets.114 Despite the expected 
increases in compliance costs, many non-U.S. companies are 
unwilling to bear the opportunity cost of delisting and consequently 
remain committed to maintaining their U.S. listings.115 Most large 
companies have said they would consider delisting, but the 
delisting trend has not gained enough momentum to push many 
non-U.S. firms to delist, particularly larger firms involved in 
generous amounts of cross-border commerce. Global 
pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca International and U.K. Telecom 
giant BT have cited their strong involvement with U.S. markets as a 
significant incentive to keep their U.S. listings despite increased 
SOX compliance costs.116  
Investors are far more likely to invest in non-U.S. firms insofar 
as they can rely upon the assurances and security provided by SEC 
registration and its accompanying compliance requirements. Many 
non-U.S. firms have found access to large numbers of investors 
outside their home country by offering shares in the U.S. capital 
markets. Foreign ownership of South Korea’s KT Corp.’s shares 
has risen from zero to forty-three percent since the company listed 
its shares on the NYSE in 1999; seventy percent of those new 
shareholders come from the U.S.117 
 The benefits of U.S. listings go beyond mere access to millions 
of affluent investors. Compliance with SEC regulations also 
benefits firms in other aspects of corporate governance. KT Corp., 
for example, recently won awards from both the Korean Stock 
Exchange and Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia as the top-rated and 
most improved corporate governance practitioners in Asia.118 In 
addition to improving visibility amongst investors, a U.S. listing 
arguably adds the advantages of transparency and liquidity that can 
ultimately translate into significant reductions in a firm’s cost of 
capital as well as an increase in stock price.119 
 
 
114 Myers, supra note 86. 
115 Id. 
116 Foreign Policy, supra note 65. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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B. Regulatory Considerations 
 
1. The long arm of the SEC 
 
The SEC seems more than willing to extend its jurisdiction 
across U.S. borders in cases involving U.S. shareholder interests. 
Recent SEC investigations of various foreign corporations120 have 
demonstrated an arguably blatant disregard for and transgression of 
geopolitical boundaries for the sake of protecting U.S. investors.121 
In early 2005, Mexican broadcaster TV Azteca complained about 
the SEC’s imposition of U.S. regulations on a Mexican company 
and Mexican citizens.122 In the instance of the TV Azteca 
investigation, the SEC used SOX provisions to justify filing several 
civil fraud charges against TV Azteca’s executive officers. The 
U.S. charged that chairman Ricardo Salinas Pliegas concealed $109 
million in profits by purchasing debt at reduced prices from 
Azteca’s cell phone subsidiary Unefon.123 Salinas denied the 
charges and accused the SEC of exerting extraterritorial jurisdiction 
in bad faith, but the SEC justified its charges with the fact that 
Azteca trades its shares on the NYSE and thus must comply with 
U.S. laws, including SOX.124 
Although Mexico's National Banking and Securities 
Commission led the investigation into TV Azteca’s dealings, the 
SEC’s public involvement with the charges raised significant 
international concerns regarding the new regulatory demands 
emanating from the U.S. Indeed, SOX provisions could raise the 
governance standard for any firm, regardless of national origin, so 
long as the firm has sufficient cooperation with subsidiaries or 
partners in the U.S.125 
Despite the lack of appreciation many have for the “financial 
imperialism” practiced by the SEC, most detractors readily admit to 
the counterproductive nature of challenging or antagonizing the 
SEC, which guards access to the best and most liquid markets in the 
 
 
120 Among others, the SEC investigated TV Azteca in Mexico, Ahold and Royal 
Dutch/Shell in the Netherlands, Spiegel in Germany, and Vivendi in France. 
Sherwood, supra note 21. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Scott Johnson, A Tough Line on Fraud, NEWSWK. INT’L, Mar. 14, 2005, at 47, 
available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7101284/site/newsweek. 
124 Id. 
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world.126 The cost of tapping into U.S. capital markets will 
inevitably catch some firms off guard, as some firms will probably 
secure U.S. listings without a precise knowledge of the U.S. driven 
obligations they are undertaking.127 Nevertheless, the SEC has 
signaled its intention to preserve investor protections without 
“inappropriately designing the U.S. capital market as one with no 
exit."128 
Regardless of changes in SEC policy, a mass exodus of non-
U.S. firms from U.S. markets should be restrained by the 
uncertainty present in the regulatory environment and the constant 
demand for access to the world's largest pool of market capital.129 
Non-U.S. firms, in particular, can benefit from adopting a proactive 
wait-and-see approach regarding delisting strategies, especially in 
light of the forthcoming reconsideration of the SEC’s 300-U.S.-
shareholders rule that may eventually exempt many firms from 
compliance and result in further savings.130 Despite the relaxation 
of deregistration requirements, a clear commercial benefit may 
prompt additional withdrawal of firms who find the size and 
complexity of U.S. markets uncompetitive and unproductive.131  
 
2. The EU’s Eighth Directive 
 
Most of the firms that have actually abandoned U.S. markets 
had relatively small presences in the U.S. to begin with.132 Thus, 
non-U.S. firms with relatively significant U.S. dealings should 
consider the impact of changing corporate governance regulations 
outside the United States. U.K. and European companies, for 
example, are unlikely to pursue U.S. delisting strategies when 
pending EU proposals may impose stricter financial regulation.133 
 
 
126 Regulatory and financial fraud specialists in Amsterdam claim that a greater 
fear of the SEC now exists than of domestic authorities and public prosecutors. 
Indeed, most firms would prefer to avoid getting into a “legal arms race with the 
SEC.” Sherwood, supra note 21. 
127 For example, one German firm who recently acquired a U.S. company will 
have to make its first internal control report in 2005. Even though it has little or no 
control over the report, nor understanding of the risks involved, the parent company 
will be liable for any shortcomings. Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See Hobson, supra note 70. Despite a slowdown in new, non-U.S. listings 
over the last few years, particularly from European countries, the NYSE saw no 
voluntary delistings in 2004. See also Sarbox Escape, supra note 30. 
130 Hobson, supra note 70. 
131 Foreign Policy, supra note 65. 
132 Delisting Trickle, supra note 34. 
133 EU Regulation, supra note 61. 
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Indeed, the new wave of financial legislation emanating from the 
EU will make delisting far less likely as Europe raises corporate 
governance practices closer to the high standards set by U.S. 
regulators.134 
In the mid-1990s, long before the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals in the U.S., the EU began looking at harmonization of 
audit regulations for its member states. Shortly thereafter, the goals 
for updating the “Eighth Directive”135 went far beyond the updating 
and harmonization of audit laws across Europe. After the financial 
scandals in the U.S. and the Parmalat136 scandal in Europe, the EU 
proposed changes designed to utilize the Eighth Directive to 
establish a new, heightened standard of corporate governance 
across Europe.137 Although its narrow focus on audit regulations 
calls into question the appropriateness of dubbing the Eighth 
Directive a European version of SOX,138 the intentions and 
expectations for both pieces of legislation are quite similar.  
The U.S. rapidly adopted new laws focused on enforcing 
executive responsibility to investors and protecting auditor 
independence.139 The EU, on the other hand, claims to have little 
need to rush into regulatory action since the European financial 
reporting regime had already remedied the kinds of structural 
problems found in the U.S.140  
Nevertheless, after the financial scandals in the EU and the 
U.S., proposals to broaden the scope of the Directive arose. Of 
particular importance are the provisions designed to strengthen the 
 
 
134 Id. 
135 Written and enacted in 1984, the Eighth Directive will be the eighth EU 
Directive on auditing since the foundation of the European Common Market.  
136 In late 2003, Parmalat, a multinational conglomerate and Italy’s eighth-largest 
industrial firm, filed for bankruptcy after an Enron-like accounting scandal came to 
light. Shockwaves erupted throughout Italian and European business communities 
after falsified bank documents revealed that $4 billion worth of company bank 
deposits were fabricated. Matt Smith, The Parmalat Syndrome, SF WEEKLY.COM, Jan. 
12, 2005, http://www.sfweekly.com/issues/2005-01-12/news/smith.html. 
137 Graeme Burton, Audit Crackdown: Claims that the European Union is 
Preparing Its Own Sarbanes Oxley Should be Treated with Skepticism, INFOCONOMY, 
http://www.infoconomy.com/pages/politics-management/group99804.adp (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2004). 
138 Id. 
139 Peter Wyman, How do Europe’s 8th Directive and Sarbanes-Oxley 
Compare?, GTNEWS.COM, Mar. 21, 2005, http://www.gtnews.com/article/5847.cfm 
(registration required). 
140 Indeed the EU and the U.K. both embarked upon reforms in the early and mid-
1990’s after a round of corporate collapses. Thus, it is arguable that European law had 
properly dealt with many of the transparency and accountability issues that that SOX 
legislation tried to clean up in 2002. Id. 
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role of the audit committee and bolster independent oversight of the 
accounting profession.141 
The EU amended one particular point of the Eighth Directive 
regarding internal controls shortly after the U.S. scandals and the 
subsequent passage of SOX. While the Eighth Directive proposal 
does not plan to employ the same stringent internal controls 
assessment and reporting requirements of SOX, it nevertheless 
requires audit firms to report on key issues arising from audits, 
such as weaknesses in internal control mechanisms for financial 
reporting.142 While SOX is generally characterized as more rules-
driven than the EU proposal, the systems share similarities.143 The 
EU adherence to the principle of minimum harmonization144 
necessarily requires member states to exercise more latitude and 
autonomy so that each may add their own specific national 
requirements on top of the general principles outlined by the Eighth 
Directive. Consequently, while the EU must still finalize and enact 
the Eighth Directive, firms must still wait and see just how far each 
respective European country will go towards enacting specific 
SOX-type requirements. Many nations will undoubtedly follow suit 
to one degree or another; the Italian Parliament, at least, will likely 
adopt sweeping legislative reforms, reorganize securities and 
financial regulators, and institute corporate governance changes 
that closely resemble SOX mandates.145  
Thus, in addition to the SEC’s willingness to work with non-
U.S. firms and nations to facilitate cost saving compromises, 
various nations around the world are likely to continue fortifying 
their capital markets and developing consumer confidence with 
stricter corporate governance regulations. With the U.S. leading the 
way with SOX, many nations stand to benefit by looking to the 
U.S. experience for guidance and by lobbying the SEC for 
 
 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 The minimum harmonization principle entails the establishment of broad, 
general minimum standards or principles which Member States have an obligation to 
follow while leaving flexibility for each respective nation to add local regulations 
governing areas not specifically excluded by the Directive. Under a minimum 
harmonization regime, France, for example, could enforce its more restrictive 
regulations regarding what non-audit services its firms may provide to audit clients. In 
this way all members can comply with the standards of the Eighth Directive, and 
maintain their own national regulations. Id. 
145 Carlotta Amaduzzi, Italian Parliament Debates Post-Parmalat Reforms, 
GOVERNANCE WKLY., http://www.issproxy.com/governance/publications/2004archive 
d/074.jsp (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
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additional compromises to increase the overlap between the U.S. 
and international compliance efforts.  
 
C. Pragmatic Considerations 
 
This section highlights a few pragmatic business-related 
considerations for firms considering compliance avoidance via 
withdrawal from U.S. markets. 
 
1. Mergers with U.S. traded firms  
 
As the likelihood of future firm mergers and international share 
trading increases, non-U.S. firms should exhibit increased interest 
in preserving SOX compliance capabilities. When management for 
potential acquirers investigates noncompliant acquirees, they will 
most likely find them in need of reforms. Indeed, SOX compliance 
capabilities may become a serious consideration when weighing a 
firm’s suitability and profitability in a proposed merger. Thus, one 
byproduct of SOX compliance measures may be an increased 
attractiveness to potential acquirers.146 Similarly, firms acquiring 
entities with U.S. traded shares will find themselves subject to SOX 
regulation as a result of an otherwise profitable and strategic 
merger. 
 
2. Reliance by lenders and insurers 
 
Many banks have started using measures similar to SOX 
requirements to provide assurances of financial safety and 
corporate integrity when issuing loans. Some private and public 
firms currently use SOX provisions in representations and 
warranties for loan documents.147 Insurance companies have also 
begun to request SOX-type assurances and protections from firms 
renewing their business insurance policies.148  
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 Foley & Lardner LLP, SOX Impact on Private Companies, FOLEY & 
LARDNER’S 2005 NAT’L DIRECTORS INST., June 7, 2005, 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/2751/NDI_SOXPrivat
eCompanies_FINAL.pdf.  
147 This is especially true for large loans given to highly leveraged companies. Id. 
148 Id. 
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3. Executive recruitment 
 
As SOX’s influence spreads, it has established a “culture of 
personal responsibility” in its wake. 149 Not only do equity investors 
have more confidence in what executives report, executives 
themselves are more certain of their own results and far more 
cautious of the liabilities imposed upon them.150 Firms refusing to 
raise reporting and audit standards to SOX-type levels may risk 
losing their ability to attract top, executive talent. Qualified 
executive officers will have understandable concerns about the 
firm’s ability to shield its officers from allegations of wrongdoing, 
regardless of whether such corporate governance measures are 
mandated or not.  
 
4. Quality directors  
 
Section 404 compliance measures have sparked a dramatic 
increase in the number of companies looking for quality, 
independent directors. Combining this fact with the tendency 
qualified directors now have, as a result of SOX, to limit their 
directorship positions results in a tight market for qualified, 
independent, outside directors.151  
Aware of the new standards, many qualified directors 
understand the new liability they could incur because of their 
directorships. Thus, good directors will serve warily, if they do at 
all, on the boards of firms that shun the kinds of controls and 
mechanisms required by SOX.152 As the culture of corporate 
transparency spreads across the globe, firms will find themselves 
unable to attract the kind of independent, quality directors that will 
most benefit the company without significantly implementing SOX-
type measures.153 
 
5. Shareholder litigation 
 
Future legal actions brought by unhappy shareholders or other 
interest holders will likely rely upon the standards of corporate 
 
 
149 Michael Useem, Global Governance: The View from the 2005 World 
Economic Forum in Davos, 2 LEADERSHIP NEWSL. (2005), available at 
http://www.dieu.com/Mail.asp?MailID=62&TopicID=588. 
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governance and internal control mechanisms set by SOX. Though 
unlisted firms may technically escape SOX compliance mandates, 
as a tactic, shareholder litigants will rely upon the highest corporate 
governance standards available to evaluate reporting practices. 
Litigants will likely characterize deviations from such standards as 
breaches of duty inasmuch as they grow to represent an industry 
standard.154 
 
6. Investors  
 
The financial scandals of the past few years have made 
investors increasingly skeptical and nervous about the integrity of 
financial statements. Additionally, savvy investors look closely at 
firms’ future growth strategies. Venture capitalists and private 
equity funds find firms with clearly defined track records or goals 
for moving into and succeeding in global markets and expanding 
overseas operations as particularly attractive. Thus, the closer 
private and non-U.S. firms come to complying with SOX as a 
means of facilitating future growth and cross-border expansion, the 
more attractive the firms’ shares will appear to forward looking 
investors.155 
 
V. PROACTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
A. Global Homogenization of Best Practices 
 
The inevitability of regulatory and cultural conflict in 
transnational operations is changing market expectations. Increased 
focus on financial integrity and a growing culture of financial 
transparency and accountability will affect all players in a global 
market. As in all markets operating with imperfect information, 
investors and corporate decision makers will rely on proxies to 
measure a firm’s adherence to the new culture. SEC enforcement 
efforts and the criminal sanctions associated with noncompliance 
will promote SOX mandates as the gold standard or, at the very 
least, as a reliable proxy against which to compare all other 
corporate governance standards. Such influence is already 
recognizable. Marco Ventoruzzo, legal counsel to the Italian stock 
exchange, characterizes SOX rules as “not so different from those 
in Italy.” Ventoruzzo further indicated that Italy enjoys the 
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“advantage of being a second comer” in creating modern 
governance rules.156 
Additionally, increased competition and U.S. regulation of the 
market place will certainly affect future regulatory and compliance 
environments abroad. Heightened awareness of corporate misdeeds 
and pragmatic concerns regarding the need for more financial 
accountability and transparency will further homogenize solutions 
implemented by corporate governance reforms across the globe. 
Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate an emerging set of unofficial 
best practices that industry leaders will come to expect, regardless 
of localized compliance regulations. It is even more feasible to 
anticipate that such practices will largely reflect the principles and 
practices outlined by SOX. Thus, in addition to the regulatory and 
pragmatic considerations outlined in the previous section, well-
advised firms weighing SOX compliance costs against U.S. listing 
values should take a long-range, holistic perspective on corporate 
governance.  
 
1. U.S. influences upon homogenization 
 
The recent flurry of financial scandals in the U.S., Latin 
America, Asia, and Europe has fueled an increasingly urgent push 
for corporate governance reforms. At the same time, the scandals 
may themselves be a response to the pressure corporations feel 
because of the reforms. The questionable veracity of financial data 
stimulates demand for more reliable and verifiable data while the 
calls for heightened scrutiny have shed light upon otherwise shady 
and “creative” corporate finance practices. Indeed, the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals alerted the rest of the world to the dire need 
for stricter controls over financial reporting, which led to the 
discovery of similar scandals in other countries. Consequently, the 
U.S. appropriately, through SOX, made the trailblazing effort to 
restore the investing public’s confidence. Not only have SOX 
efforts reestablished the image and safety of U.S. capital markets, 
but other world economic leaders will follow suit to one extent or 
another. 
Asia, Latin America, and Europe all have sufficient incentive to 
continue improving and aligning corporate governance reforms to 
further facilitate further global trade and investment. Not only are 
most of these areas influenced by U.S. dealings or subject to the 
 
 
156 Clay Risen, Cowboy Justice, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2004, 
http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:OJufx6t-zHcJ:www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml%3Fi%3D 
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SEC’s extraterritorial reach, increased transnational dealings 
among non-U.S. firms will further homogenize corporate 
governance practices. Air China’s efforts to offer shares on both the 
Hong Kong and London stock exchanges evidence this trend. The 
ability to use the same prospectus for both listings and the 
undeniable benefit of doing business in similar regulatory 
environments enhances the attractiveness of such dual listings.157 In 
such cases, the fact that countries increasingly respect the standards 
embodied in SOX make them the standard of choice. 
Now that U.S. firms have safely passed section 404 compliance 
hurdles, even though some did so only with significant concessions 
from U.S. regulators, the willingness of non-U.S. firms to comply 
should increase.158 Though costly and time consuming, compliance 
benefits, including discoveries of legitimate and material 
weaknesses in reporting controls, make SOX all the more attractive. 
Executive officers for some non-U.S. firms fully expect SOX 
compliance to pay dividends through renewed investor 
confidence.159 In particular, the recent governance reform 
experiences of two countries, Japan and Mexico, highlight the 
spreading culture of transparency and accountability, which many 
countries are rapidly assimilating in an effort to fuel economic 
development and progress. 
 
2. Japan 
 
Yoshihiko Miyauchi, chairman and CEO of Japanese firm Orix 
Corp., expects Orix to realize gains from “the recognition that we 
have met the SEC’s and NYSE’s requirements for transparency and 
governance.”160 Chairman Miyauchi’s comment illustrates the 
cultural impact that SOX has outside of the U.S. Until recently, 
long-entrenched customs and traditions enshrined Japanese 
corporate governance with a virtual shroud of secrecy. Japanese 
corporate reforms actually began in the late 1990s as a response to 
increasing foreign investment and growing capital flows from non-
Japanese sources. Investors demanded that public companies 
become less opaque, but reforms came at a painfully slow pace. 
Although foreigners currently own thirty-four percent of Japanese 
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shares compared with twenty-three percent six years ago,161 calls 
for increased transparency seemed to fall upon deaf ears until 
recent financial scandals prompted Japan to jumpstart financial 
reform efforts. 
In early 2005, the government charged Yoshiaki Tsutsumi, the 
infamous Shogun-style Japanese chairman of railroad, real estate, 
and global hotel conglomerate Seibu Group, with extensive insider 
trading and falsifying corporate records.162 Many view the Seibu 
scandal as an important milestone in Japan’s previously sputtering 
attempts163 to reform long-standing traditions of weak corporate 
accountability and autocratic governance.164 Indeed, both Japanese 
regulators and Japanese firms in the private sector took significant 
steps to reform the tradition-bound culture in Japanese boardrooms 
that fostered Tsutsumi-like governance for generations.165 
Recent regulatory efforts to boost public confidence and 
facilitate foreign investment have resulted in changes to Japanese 
securities transaction laws. Effective since mid-2005, these new 
laws effectively give financial regulators greater authority to 
investigate corporate wrongdoing.166 The increased regulatory 
 
 
161 Anthony Faiola, Tsutsumi Case Puts Japan’s Lords of Business on Notice, 
WASH. POST, June 9, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/08/AR2005060802330.html?sub=new. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Once named the richest and most powerful corporate executive on earth by 
Forbes magazine, Chairman Tsutsumi wielded absolute power over Seibu Group for 
four decades. He once went seven years without holding a single official board 
meeting. Much like a monarch, he ruled the international conglomerate by personal 
decree. Former employees reported living in fear of Tsutsumi who was known to 
readily fire or slap in the face employees who incurred his displeasure. When 
Tsutsumi exited the company's commuter train in northern Tokyo, rows of Seibu 
workers would bow in unison as he left his private train car. It is a testimony to the 
culture of corporate loyalty in Japan in general, and at Seibu in particular, that two 
company executives reportedly committed suicide rather than cooperate in the 
investigation of Tsutsumi. Id. 
165 Managing Director of the Tokyo Stock Exchange Eisuke Nagatomo reported 
that responsibility to shareholders is becoming more valued than a chairman or CEO’s 
monarchial authority, an idea that “has not always been at front and center in Japan,” 
but one that is “finally changing.” Id. 
166 The Japanese Financial Services Agency (FSA) and the Securities and 
Exchange Surveillance Commission have long been considered paper tigers whose 
annual budgets equal only four percent of the U.S. SEC’s typical budget. As of late, 
the FSA has rather actively issued new standards for internal controls over financial 
reporting and new standards on quality control for audits. See Program for Further 
Financial Reform, Japan’s Challenge: Moving Toward a Financial Services Nation, 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/policy/reform/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005); Press 
Release, Fin. Serv. Agency (Japan), Further Enhancing Market Functions and 
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authority resulted in rapid action. In mid-2005 the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) delisted Seibu and three other companies, 
including cosmetics giant Kanebo, for willfully misleading 
investors.167 Although the TSE has not ejected a public company 
for such actions in twenty-five years, the push for increased 
accountability seems stronger than the inertia of Japan’s corporate 
culture where saving face is often prized above all else. The TSE 
now requires the chief executives of listed firms to sign SOX-like 
statements, personally vouching for the accuracy of financial 
reports.168 
 
3. Mexico 
 
As Mexico and other Latin American countries play an 
increasingly significant role in the global economy, corporate 
governance reforms will surely follow. Although the Mexican 
investment climate is generally considered favorable, increased 
global integration has led to increased scrutiny of its business and 
regulatory practices. U.S. enforcement of SOX has pressured 
regulators and corporations to do more to find and eliminate 
fraud.169 In addition to section 404’s internal control requirements, 
SOX provisions also aim at curtailing money laundering, requiring 
U.S. firms to perform tougher “due diligence” investigations of 
foreign partners.170 Mexico enacted significant financial reforms in 
2005, thus strengthening its financial regulation infrastructure. The 
Mexican Congress expects to pass new securities laws requiring 
stricter controls over financial reporting,171 and the National 
Banking and Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria 
y de Valores) launched financial investigations into seventy 
Mexican firms.172 Unsurprisingly, the proposed Mexican Securities 
                                                                                                          
Improving Confidence in Japanese Markets (Aug. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/summary/index.html. 
167 Faiola, supra note 161. 
168 Id. 
169 Johnson, supra note 123. 
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171 On the last day of the Session, the Finance Committee of the Chamber of 
Deputies gave the green light to the Securities Markets Law (Ley de Mercados de 
Valores). As the Senate has already passed the reforms, it is highly expected that law 
will pass easily in the fall session beginning September 2005. Kenneth Emmond, 
Securities Reform: A Big Opportunity for Mexico, MEXIDATA.INFO, July 18, 2005, 
http://www.mexidata.info/id547.html. 
172 Johnson, supra note 123. 
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Market Law contains SOX-like elements and measures designed to 
enhance transparency and promote better corporate governance.173  
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests is of particular 
concern for investors in Mexican markets. Many are awaiting the 
exact wording of the regulation that determines exactly when 
regulatory agencies must give notice to minority shareholders that a 
firm is under scrutiny for noncompliance.174 As it stands, Mexican 
minority shareholders often do not know until late in the game that 
the shadow of regulatory investigation may have devalued their 
stock. The TV Azteca scandal illustrates just how tough it is for 
investors to get their hands on relevant information. The only news 
Mexican investors received about insider trading and corporate 
fraud allegations in the TV Azteca scandal came from the SEC.175 
Although the probability that Mexico will enact significant 
reform in coming years is debatable,176 the financial incentive to 
clean up their markets is obvious. Anticipating absorption of firms 
delisting from U.S. markets, authors of the proposed Mexican 
Securities Market Law continue to try to overcome the notion that 
noncompliant companies circumvent compliance mandates by 
fleeing to the freewheeling Mexican markets. Authorities can only 
accomplish this by creating a credible, legal compliance framework 
that attracts capital and instills confidence in firms choosing to list 
on the Mexican Stock Exchange.177 When the Securities Market 
Law was first proposed in 2004, the Mexican Stock Exchange had 
roughly 150 listings. By comparison, the South Korean Exchange, 
with a similar-sized economy, has more than 1,500 listings.178 
Foreign investment has substantially increased in Mexico in recent 
years, and regulators seem willing to do whatever it takes to keep 
the momentum going with legal reforms to reinforce the trend of 
growing transparency in Mexico.179 The TV Azteca scandal may 
 
 
173 More specifically, the Mexican bill calls for company officers convicted of 
insider trading to face up to 12 years in prison and fines of up to half a million dollars. 
Emmond, supra note 171.  
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Geri Smith, A Lesson in Transparency for Mexico, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 17, 
2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_03/b3916035_ 
mz011.htm (highlighting the massive cultural challenges timid regulators face in 
reforming free-wheeling Mexican businesses).  
177 Emmond, supra note 171. 
178 Id. 
179 Few Mexican firms engaged in good investor relation efforts in the mid-1990s 
while most major Mexican firms have strong investor relation operations today. 
Johnson, supra note 123. 
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have pushed Mexico to jumpstart badly needed reforms.180 Aware 
of the significant growth opportunities if they succeed, Mexican 
regulators have plenty of incentive to continue on their chosen path 
of reform. 
 
4. Reevaluating the allure of delisting strategies 
 
The financial institutions that facilitate the liquidity so valued 
by public firms might have required—through competitive market 
forces—more exacting internal controls, regardless of U.S. 
compliance mandates.181 This raises the question of the true 
necessity of SOX. Could the system have corrected itself without 
the U.S. government forcing firms to bear arguably unnecessary 
compliance costs?182 Although the question is largely irrelevant and 
rhetorical for most U.S. firms at this point, non-U.S. firms must 
consider the role that both U.S. regulation and market forces play 
and will continue to play in driving governance standards higher.183  
Considering the heightened transparency levels expected by 
both regulators and investors, most firms, regardless of where in the 
world their headquarters is located, must take a long, hard look at 
where SOX compliance will eventually lead them. As the knee-jerk 
reaction of strict regulation and enforcement gives way to the 
flexible and cooperative concessions issued by the SEC and the 
PCAOB, companies faced with compliance cost concerns should 
recognize the equally shortsighted nature of delisting solutions. 
Regulatory mandates and compliance costs aside, firms adopting a 
proactive approach to corporate governance and investor relations 
are poised to reap the benefits of confidence and flexibility that 
only full and active participation in efficient and reliable capital 
markets may garner.  
 
B. Embracing the Benefits of Proactive Governance 
 
Information is crucial to the health and vitality of both investors 
and capital markets. Because of the critical roles that information 
and information distribution occupy for investor-owned and 
investor-oriented companies, it is not surprising that Mexican 
 
 
180 Id. 
181 See Engel et al., supra note 27. 
182 See id. (analyzing the value of SOX regulation in light of contract law’s 
inability to enforce proper disclosure or deter insider trading and evaluating the 
potential benefit of the legislative solution to private firms). 
183 Id. 
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telephone giant, Telmex, increased visibility and transparency 
through its SOX compliance efforts.184 Telmex executives further 
characterized SOX mandates as a welcome opportunity for 
improvement rather than an obstacle to be avoided.185 
Although anecdotal, the Telmex experience illustrates how a 
proactive approach leverages the time and money spent on 
improving informational and decision-based strategies. Firms must 
choose between merely tolerating and suffering through costly 
compliance initiatives or taking full advantage of SOX to make 
reporting procedures more efficient and gain more control over 
operations.  
Investor confidence concerns aside, proactive governances 
advocates argue that good governance leads to improved business 
information and consequently more confident and sound decision-
making.186 Recognizing both the internal and external benefits they 
may derive from strong governance practices, a handful of 
progressive firms embrace a proactive approach to corporate 
governance, some even going beyond SOX and NYSE listing 
standards. NASDAQ’s General Counsel observed that some seek 
out these enhanced standards specifically to satisfy institutional 
investors’ focus on good governance.187 Other firms have reported 
that enhanced reporting procedures and governance structures have 
enabled compliance with both SOX and non-U.S. GAAP disclosure 
practices.188 Strategically leveraging compliance initiatives into 
reform opportunities has led others to extend SOX standards 
beyond the executive level by requiring managers to evaluate and 
certify the work of their own business units.189  
For some, greater awareness of a firm’s inner workings is well 
worth the hassle and cost of compliance. Among the many 
perceived benefits is the expectation that improvements in 
management’s internal control assessment will likely improve risk 
 
 
184 Myers, supra note 86. 
185 Id. 
186 Stone, supra note 5. 
187 Corporate Counsel, supra note 28. 
188 German pharmaceutical group Altana reported leveraging compliance 
measures to satisfy more than one set of regulatory requirements. Myers, supra note 
86. 
189 In general, non-U.S. companies may follow home-country reporting and 
control practices. Nevertheless, some firms voluntarily chose to follow the NYSE 
requirements for U.S. companies regardless of the difference in home-country rules or 
business practices. Other non-U.S. firms have relied upon the NYSE’s code of ethics 
when revising their own code despite the absence of jurisdiction to compel such 
adoption. Id. 
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identification and allow companies to better respond to changing 
market demands.190 Additionally, a proactive approach improves 
controls and leads to increased operating efficiency, reduced 
litigation, and stronger fraud controls.191 
 
C. Proactive Investor Relations 
 
SOX compliance, voluntary or not, builds an environment of 
trust that may take more than a lifetime to create but can disappear 
in seconds.192 The standards embodied in SOX guard that trust. 
Strong corporate governance and investor relation programs should 
aim to communicate to actual and potential shareholders that 
management’s interests align with investors’ interests.193 This 
joining of a public relations function with the higher-level 
operations of compliance and equity fundraising may seem counter-
intuitive to some. However, such an expansive and proactive view 
of governance initiatives readily recognizes SOX compliance and 
other reform expenses as worthwhile outlays. Firms garner value 
insofar as compliance efforts send “a clear message to the 
markets,” showing how committed the company is to “protecting 
minority rights and creating shareholder value by adopting the best 
corporate governance practices set forth in every market where . . . 
shares are traded.”194 The expensive and time-consuming nature of 
SOX compliance, which makes delisting so understandably 
attractive, justifies itself as a worthy investment when placed in the 
context of long-term, holistic growth strategies. Aside from all the 
logistical, personnel, and compliance costs associated with 
lowering the number of U.S. shareholders below 300, and aside 
from the technical and legal requirements of SEC deregistration, 
firms must seriously evaluate the message that delisting and 
deregistering may send to the investing public. Such a strategy may 
very well communicate to investors that the firm will spend 
millions just so they can avoid improving the same corporate 
 
 
190 SOX critics argue that the costs of section 404 outweigh the actual benefits as 
compliance will do little to prevent future corporate scandals and the benefits derived 
from the implementation do not justify the significant costs. See supra Part II.B. For a 
more detailed criticism of the specific SOX provisions that will do little to remedy 
corporate governance shortcomings and pitfalls, see Huffman, supra note 1, at 255–
57. 
191 Id. 
192 Myers, supra note 86. 
193 See id. 
194 Id. 
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governance standards upon which investors rely for confidence.195 
Conversely, SOX compliance initiatives present firms with valuable 
opportunities to reevaluate and strengthen investor relation 
strategies. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Well-governed non-U.S. firms, who at least value and plan for 
stronger governance initiatives, should find the compliance efforts 
well worth their time and money. Firms engaging in avoidance of 
SOX-type reforms may find that cultural and market forces will 
penalize them for lax governance reform initiatives. The SOX 
implementation drama awakened the global community to the need 
for increased accountability and established a growing culture keen 
on exhibiting responsible and transparent corporate governance 
practices. As the harsh reaction to worldwide corporate scandals 
subsides, non-U.S. firms should refrain from joining in the anti-
SOX backlash by hastily pursuing delisting strategies, incurring 
extremely high opportunity costs unavoidable by all but a small 
handful of closely held firms. The hassle, complexity, and cost of 
delisting and deregistering quickly erode the value of delisting 
strategies, especially considering the opportunity cost of forgoing 
access to U.S. capital markets, precluding opportunities for U.S. 
partnerships, and preemptively limiting future U.S. operations. 
Once U.S. and non-U.S. firms view the SOX drama as a knee-
jerk reaction meant to protect the primacy and reliability of U.S. 
capital markets, and once investors and companies realize that the 
reactionary zeal is subsiding, firms will begin leveraging corporate 
governance reforms proactively, pragmatically, and strategically. 
Many non-U.S. companies stand to benefit from SOX-governance 
initiatives. Concessions from U.S. regulators in combination with 
the compliance efforts of U.S. firms have eased the path for non-
U.S. firms looking to leverage proactive governance strategies. If 
firms do not embrace and eventually exhibit good governance 
values, cross-cultural expectations, and competitive and regulatory 
forces may eventually disadvantage such firms. Most non-U.S. 
firms that have increased involvement with U.S. firms or markets 
on their immediate horizon will ultimately find some measure of 
SOX-like governance reform beneficial and inescapable.  
Just as Hero and Claudio overcome the drama and complexity 
of courtship to find bliss at the end of Much Ado About Nothing, the 
 
 
195 See Sherwood, supra note 21. 
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SOX drama will soon subside and well-intentioned firms who can 
see past the drama will be able to preserve and develop valuable 
relationships with U.S. capital markets and investors. 
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